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Abstract 
 
Choice and competition in education have found growing support from both policy makers and 
academics in the recent past. Yet evidence on the actual benefits of market-orientated reforms is at 
best mixed. Moreover, while the economic rationale for choice and competition is clear, in existing 
work there is rarely an attempt to distinguish between the two concepts. In this paper, we study 
whether pupils in Primary schools in England with a wider range of school choices achieve better 
academic outcomes than those whose choice is more limited; and whether Primary schools facing 
more competition perform better than those in a more monopolistic situation. In simple least squares 
regression models we find little evidence of a link between choice and achievement, but uncover a 
small positive association between competition and school performance. Yet this could be related to 
endogenous school location or pupil sorting. In fact, an instrumental variable strategy based on 
discontinuities generated by admissions district boundaries suggests that the performance gains from 
greater school competition are limited. Only when we restrict our attention to Voluntary Aided 
schools, which have more freedom in managing their governance and admission practices, do we find 
some evidence of a positive causal link between competition and pupil achievement. 
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1. Introduction 
Choice has been the big policy idea in education for quite some time, and it is an 
idea that is increasingly being pushed hard in the UK. Choice may be a good thing 
in itself because people value their freedom to choose. Yet, most proponents stress 
that it leads educational providers to compete for pupils by improving their 
technology, thus raising educational standards. Additionally, it is argued that gains 
may directly arise from choice through better matching of pupils with schools 
according to personal tastes and needs. These issues have been widely researched 
in the US, with an extensive literature in the education and economics of education 
fields (Hoxby, 2000, 2003, 2004). However, it seems only fair to say that the 
existing evidence is mixed, and at best offers a shaky foundation for policy. 
Despite this, a quasi-market in education has political currency.1 In this paper 
we study school choice and competition, with the aim of uncovering empirical 
evidence for the hypothesised performance advantages that advocates of choice and 
competition say underpin these policy ideas. We focus explicitly on two 
conceptually distinct questions: 1) Do pupils perform better if they have more 
schools from which to choose, conditional on where they live; 2) Do pupils 
perform better if they are enrolled in schools that have to compete with many other 
                                                 
1 See Le Grand (1991, 1993) and the more recent discussion in Machin and Vignoles (2005). In the 
recent 2005 UK government election, the two leading parties both supported it in their manifestos. 
Labour’s pledged was that “good schools will be able to expand their size and also their influence – 
by taking over less successful schools” (Labour Party, 2005a). The Conservatives pledged a right to 
choose that “will give real autonomy to all schools, and real choice to parents”, with the claim that 
“choice drives up standards in every field of human endeavour [and]… put[s] pressure on 
underperforming schools to raise their standards” (Conservative Party, 2005). 
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schools to attract pupils, given where pupils live? We consider these questions to 
be the most relevant when evaluating the likely impacts of policies designed to 
expand the choice set available to families, without requiring them to move house. 
As such, we abstract from the kind of choice that can by exercised by changes in 
residential location (Tiebout, 1956), which has been studied elsewhere (e.g. Hoxby, 
2000).  
Our analysis, which use rich administrative data on Primary school pupils in 
the South East of England, allows us to improve on the existing (largely US-based) 
literature, since the data contains detailed information on pupil and school 
addresses, which we will use to construct separate choice and competition indices. 
We also make use of the fact that only a small percentage of pupils in England 
attend Primary schools outside of their home Local Education Authority (LEA) 
because there are institutional barriers to doing so. This allows us to derive credible 
instrumental variables for the competition and choice indices, based on the 
boundary discontinuity that these barriers generate. We use this empirical strategy 
to solve the difficult issues of endogeneity that are inextricably associated with 
studying connections between pupil performance and choice/competition. 
In the empirical analysis, simple least squares regressions show no link 
between choice and achievement, but a small positive association between school 
competition and performance. However, this seems to be related to endogenous 
pupil sorting or school location, since instrumental variable estimates show that 
there are no general benefits to be had from increasing school competition. It is 
only a minority of schools, namely Voluntary Aided schools with autonomous 
governance and admission procedures, which seem to respond positively to a 
greater degree of competition with local schools.  
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The next section outlines the 
ideas surrounding debates on choice and competition and provides a short guide to 
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the (vast) empirical evidence from the US and the (scant) empirical evidence from 
the UK. Then, we discuss how choice and competition relate to the current 
admissions system in England. Following that, in Section 4 we explain our 
empirical methods. Section 5 describes the data and Section 6 presents our results. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background and Previous Research  
Theoretical discussions of the benefits of school choice and competition, and on its 
less desirable consequences, are wide ranging and often highly politicised. 
Although broad philosophical issues are often involved (Brighouse, 2000), here we 
will mainly attend to the narrower claims about the potential productivity and 
performance benefits that have been the prime focus of applied work in the field. 
The arguments are fairly well rehearsed, and there are many theoretical expositions 
that focus on different aspects of the issue2, so the purpose of this section is to 
briefly outline the key themes that motivate and structure our empirical work. 
Behind any analysis in this field lie two ideal modes of school provision: (1) 
the community-school model, in which only pupils living nearby the school are 
allowed in; and (2) the parental-choice model, in which schools admit pupils 
regardless of where they live, and parental preference is the deciding factor. 
Broadly speaking, mode (1) has traditionally been the most dominant form of state 
provision in most parts of the world. However, comparison of the relatively weak 
performance of state-sector schools operating under mode (1), with respect to 
schools in the private sector which operate largely on mode (2), has led many 
(following on from Friedman, 1962) to advocate expansion of choice as the road to 
                                                 
2 See, inter alia, Epple and Romano (1998), Epple, Newlon and Romano (2002), McMillan (2004) 
and Nechyba (2000, 2003). 
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better schooling. Alternative systems have begun to be adopted worldwide (Plank 
and Sykes, 2003).  
Advocates of mode (2) tend to base their claims on two standard efficiency 
arguments from economic theory. According to the first argument, community-
based schools serving single neighbourhoods are monopolistic, and the incentives 
for improvement or adoption of new teaching technologies may be weak. These 
incentives need to come from good governance, supported by strong institutional 
arrangements including training, monitoring, mechanisms for self-evaluation and 
performance-related pay. The alternative is to give parents freedom of choice, to 
link school finance, management incentives and teacher pay to school popularity, 
and so create a market incentive mechanism. Under this system, schools must adapt 
to meet parental demands – presumably to include high educational standards – or 
fail and close. We refer to this mechanism as a school competition effect stemming 
from greater parental choice in education markets. The second economic argument 
is that gains arise through the reallocation of pupils to schools according to 
personal tastes and pedagogic needs. Consider a move from a community-based to 
choice-based system: if every pupil can find a school that that they enjoy at least as 
much as the school that was available under the old system, the new system must 
be welfare improving. Additionally, if every pupil can find a school that offers a 
teaching technology that educates them at least as effectively as under the 
community-based system, then academic achievement should improve. We refer to 
this second mechanism as a direct choice effect of school provision operating 
under mode (2). 
In defence of mode (1) it has been claimed that teaching works better in a 
stable environment, where teachers are not under undue competitive pressures and 
where there is lower search-based turnover (which may have detrimental effects on 
achievement; Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2004; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2007a). 
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Moreover, schools could respond to an increase in competition by reducing costly 
effort and going down-market in order to serve only those with weak preferences 
for school performance (McMillan, 2004). Another overarching concern is that 
even if wider school choice boosts some pupils’ achievements, these benefits may 
come at the cost of increased between-school segregation and the gains may not be 
equally distributed.3 In this case, it would be important to know whether the gains 
to the “winners” outweigh the costs to those who lose out (i.e. whether school 
competition is a “tide to lift all boats”; Hoxby (2003)). Finally, total pupil travel 
distances could be greater when pupils do not automatically attend their closest 
neighbourhood school, with consequent environmental impacts and detrimental 
effects on achievement because of lateness, absence or stress.  
Given all these counterbalancing arguments, solid empirical evidence on the 
effects of school choice and competition is needed in order to make informed 
policy decisions. In fact, a substantial volume of quantitative evidence has been 
produced over the past decades – using various approaches – particularly in the US 
context. The first and most common empirical framework uses cross-sectional, 
geographically-based school choice/competition indices to explore the effects of 
implicit variation in the level of choice available in different school markets (e.g. 
Belfield and Levin, 2003 for a survey, and Hoxby, 2000, and Rothstein, 2006a for 
recent examples). Our empirical work adopts this style of approach. One 
fundamental empirical problem here is the definition of the choice/competition 
indicator. The general idea is to first define a market area, and then measure the 
number of choices available within it. However, this depends entirely on prior 
assumptions about the markets and the appropriate units of choice: for example, 
                                                 
3 Although the theoretical argument for the link between choice, competition and segregation is not 
clear, and could point in either direction.  
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some studies look at the number of schools within a school district, whilst others 
look at the number of school districts within a metropolitan area. Another difficulty 
is that the choice/competition indices are potentially correlated with unobserved 
pupil, family or area characteristics. Hoxby (2000) provides one of the best known 
solutions to this problem, observing that pupils perform better in US metropolitan 
areas that are naturally subdivided (by rivers) into a greater number of school 
admission districts (thus offering a wider variety of schools).4 Generally, studies 
adopting this competition index-based approach come to varying conclusions, and 
Belfield and Levin’s (2003) summary is that “the gains from competition are 
modest in scope with respect to realistic changes in levels of competition”, with 
many results statistically insignificant. Importantly, none of these studies separates 
the influence of parental or pupil choice from the effect of inter-school 
competition, although these are quite distinct concepts. In the empirical work we 
present below, we try to address all these issues: the appropriate definition and 
endogeneity of the choice-competition index in educational achievement models, 
and the distinction between choice and competition.  
Other methodological approaches appear in the literature, but all have their 
drawbacks. Some studies evaluate the benefits of institutional systems that widen 
access to private schooling through voucher systems (Rouse, 1998; Mizala and 
Romaguera, 2005). Although these studies might say something about the benefits 
that the private sector offers over schooling in the state sector, they say very little 
about the expansion of choice or competition in its own right. One extension is to 
                                                 
4 Note that Hoxby’s paper is concerned with choice across school districts, exercised by Tiebout 
residential moves, not with choice conditional on place of residence. Recently, the validity of the 
stream-based instruments and the robustness of Hoxby’s results have been contested (Rothstein, 
2006b; Hoxby, 2006). 
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measure the effects of private school enrolment on local state school performance 
(Hoxby, 1994, 2004), but this strategy is complicated by the possibility that the 
location of private schools is endogenous to neighbourhood status, and such 
schools are likely to skim off higher-achieving pupils from the state sector (Epple 
and Romano, 1998). Other studies evaluate the impact of policy changes that 
introduce greater choice into geographically localised educational markets, in some 
cases using research designs that exploit random assignment to choice 
programmes. Again, some researchers find positive benefits (Holmes et al., 2003; 
Hoxby, 2003; Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Lavy, 2005), whilst others do not (Cullen 
et al. 2003, 2005). All these findings are difficult to generalize, given the highly 
localised and peculiar settings under analysis. Moreover, it is difficult to judge 
whether any benefits occur because choice improves the match of pupils with 
educational providers or because it increases competitive pressure. 
All in all, it has to be said that the international evidence is voluminous, but 
mixed in its findings. In contrast, evidence specifically for Britain is almost non-
existent. A few studies show evidence of positive links between competition and 
performance, popularity or efficiency (Levacic 2004; Bradley et al. 2000, 2001). 
On the other hand, Clark (2005) reports that reforms that handed more power to 
schools (in the late 1980s) only generated modest efficiency gains through 
competition effects. Otherwise, all the research effort in Britain has been directed 
at the effects of competition on segregation (e.g. Goldstein and Noden, 2003; 
Gorard, Taylor and Fitz, 2003; Burgess et al., 2004; Gibbons and Telhaj 2007b), 
which we do not pursue here.  
The empirical work we present in this paper is, therefore, the first pupil-level 
analysis of the effects of choice and competition on academic achievement in 
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Primary schools in England, and the first distinguishing these two concepts 
empirically.5 Moreover, our analysis is based on a large pupil census for a sizable 
part of the South of England, which is thus generally representative. Finally, 
exploiting some institutional features of school admissions across school district 
boundaries, we devise a solid instrumental variable (IV) strategy, which we 
describe in more detail below.  
3. School Choice and Competition in English Primary Schools 
The current state-school system in England is something of a hybrid of a 
community-based model and a parental-choice setting (i.e., models (1) and (2) 
discussed above). Traditionally neighbourhood-based, the principle of choice has 
been extended to a greater or lesser extent in different areas since the Education 
Reform Act of 1988 (see e.g. Glennerster, 1991). The trend has continued recently, 
with further expansion of choice being advocated in many quarters.6 
Although choice at the Secondary education phase tends to dominate the 
political rhetoric and policy discussion, in this paper we will consider the effects of 
choice and competition among Primary state schools only.7 The reasons for this are 
two-fold. First, we believe that choices made at Primary age are critical for later 
educational success (see Heckman, 2000, and Dearden et al., 2004), and that 
parents are very active in exercising choice at the Primary level (as evidenced by 
                                                 
5 Bayer and McMillan (2005) is the only other work conceptually distinguishing the two ideas. Yet 
the authors’ structural modelling approach only allows estimating the effect of school competition. 
6 See, for example the UK Government’s October 2005 White Paper: “Higher Standards, Better 
Schools for All: More choice for parents and pupils”. 
7 The UK Labour party, for example, has proposals to make all Secondary schools Specialist schools 
with their own curriculum specialisations and to allow popular schools to expand in response to 
demand (Labour Party 2005b). 
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research on the house price effects of Primary school performance in Gibbons and 
Machin, 2003, 2006). Secondly, travel distances have a greater role to play in 
Primary school choice because children of this age are not independent travellers. 
This means that geographical criteria are likely to be more relevant in deciding 
which school to attend, so that the availability of schools can be more confidently 
inferred from geographical measures of accessibility. 
All state schools in England are funded largely by central government, 
through Local Education Authorities (LEA) that are responsible for schools in their 
geographical domain, and, crucially, funding is linked to the number of pupils 
enrolled in schools. Primary schools in the state-sector fall into a number of 
different categories, and differ in terms of the way they are governed, who controls 
pupil admissions, and their religious affiliation (if any). In addition there is a small 
private, fee-paying sector, which we do not consider here.8 The key differences 
between the various types of state school – Community, Voluntary Controlled, 
Foundation and Voluntary Aided– are set out in Appendix Table A1. About 60% of 
the 14500 (or so) Primary schools in England are classified as Community schools, 
with a further 15% being Voluntary Controlled schools (predominantly Faith 
schools). Next, Foundation schools account for about 2% (86% of which are not 
connected to a particular Faith) and Voluntary Aided for about 23% of the state-
Primary sector (97% of which are religiously affiliated). 
All schools are run by a Governing Body composed of members elected 
from amongst parents and staff (Parent Governors and Staff Governors), members 
appointed by the LEA (LEA Governors), members appointed by the church or 
charitable foundation that owns the school premises (where relevant – Foundation 
                                                 
8 Private schools educate around 6%-7% of pupils in England as a whole. 
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Governors), and members appointed from the community (e.g. local businesses) by 
the Governing Body. The Governing Body sets the strategic direction of the school, 
draws up school policies, sets targets and monitors performance, although day-to-
day running is down to the head teacher (principal) and his or her leadership team. 
The constitution of the Governing Body is crucial because it determines how much 
influence various stakeholders have in the way the school is run and, in particular, 
the balance between control by the LEA and control by the church or charitable 
foundation associated with the school.  For the purpose of our analysis, the most 
important distinction is the one between Voluntary Aided schools, where the 
charity or foundation has a controlling majority within the Governing body and so 
a strong influence on the running of the school, and all other types of schools 
where governance is shared more equally among LEA representatives, teaching 
staff and parents. We suspect the arrangement in “majority controlled” Voluntary 
Aided schools to be more conducive to a focused, competitive ethos in which the 
setting of targets, drawing up of strategies, adoption of technologies and 
monitoring of performance will be seen as a way to attract pupils through the 
promise of excellence. On the other hand, in other “non-majority controlled” 
school types, there is a greater need to balance the objective of high standards for 
high-achieving children with appropriate education for children from diverse 
backgrounds, including those with English as additional language and those with 
special educational needs. These distinctions are important when considering the 
different incentives that competition may have for different school types. 
Overall, all LEAs and schools must organise their admissions arrangements 
in accordance with the current (statutory) Department of Education and Skills 
School Admissions Code of Practice. The guiding principle of this document is that 
parental choice should be the first consideration when ranking applications to a 
Primary school. Yet if the number of applicants exceeds the number of available 
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places, almost any criterion which is not discriminatory, does not involve selection 
by ability and can be clearly assessed by parents, can be used to prioritise 
applicants.9 These vary in detail, but preference is usually given first to children 
with special educational needs, next to children with siblings in the school and to 
those children who live closest. For Faith schools, regular attendance at designated 
local churches (or other expressions of religious commitment) is foremost. Note 
that less than 50% of pupils attend their closest Community school, which shows 
that there is not a one-to-one mapping between where a child lives and where they 
go to school and suggests that parents have some scope to exercise their “right to 
choose”. 
However, one important restriction applies. Families are allowed to apply to 
schools in LEAs other than their LEA of residence, but parents must make separate 
applications to other LEAs, and, more importantly, LEAs do not have a statutory 
requirement to find a school for pupils from other LEAs: the law only requires that 
they provide enough schools for pupils in “their area”.10 As a result, banking on 
admission to a popular school in another LEA is a high-risk strategy, and cross-
LEA attendance is not commonplace in Primary schools. In our study area in and 
around London only 4.7% of Community school pupils, 3% of Voluntary 
Controlled pupils and 6% of Foundation school pupils attend a school located 
                                                 
9 LEAs now publish their admissions policy, complete with information on historical patterns of 
admission in each school in their jurisdiction (for example Barnet, 2005; Enfield, 2005) 
10 The Education Act 1996 section 14 reads: “(1)A Local Education Authority shall secure that 
sufficient schools for providing (a) Primary education, and  (b) education that is Secondary education 
by virtue of section 2(2)(a), are available for their area. (2) The schools available for an area shall not 
be regarded as sufficient for the purposes of subsection (1) unless they are sufficient in number, 
character and equipment to provide for all pupils the opportunity of appropriate education” 
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outside their home LEA. For Voluntary Aided schools, the rate of LEA crossing is 
slightly higher, but is still only about 10%. 
As to the actual extent of competition faced by Primary schools, it is 
important to notice that state Primary schools are universally non-selective by 
ability, do not have explicit curriculum specialisations, and are mixed gender. Yet 
there is considerable heterogeneity in terms of their performance, and enrolment 
rates are likely to be elastic with respect to quality measures, as evidenced by 
research on the house price effects of Primary school performance in England 
(Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2006; Cheshire and Sheppard 2004). Given that 
Primary institutions are mainly funded according to pupil numbers, schools have 
strong incentives to attract pupils by improving educational standards:11 failing 
schools are under threat of falling enrolment, shrinking funding and reduced 
personnel and could eventually be closed. Popular schools on the other hand 
receive growing numbers of applications, more resources and are able to expand. In 
addition, high-flying schools can receive extra resources and recognition for their 
excellence (e.g. so called “Beacon schools”) and headteacher pay schemes are 
explicitly linked to performance.  
One final remark is worth making: we expect these competition incentives to 
be stronger in Voluntary Aided schools, where the church or charitable foundation 
manages the school admission systems via the Governing body and so is directly 
responsible for attracting pupils and funding. On the other hand, numbers in 
undersubscribed “non-majority controlled” schools, such as Community schools 
                                                 
11 As already mentioned, schools are funded on a per-pupil basis (with adjustments for special needs 
and economic deprivation); yet the marginal costs of teaching extra children within a class group are 
small in purely financial terms. Schools are also evaluated on the basis of pupil pass rates in national 
tests (the league tables). For these reasons it is not hard to believe that these incentives are real. 
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for which the Local Education Authority handles admissions centrally, are often 
topped up with pupils who could not be accommodated in their school(s) of choice. 
This undoubtedly weakens the potential link between parental choice and school 
competition.12 
4. Empirical Methods 
4.1. Defining and measuring choice and competition 
The concept of competition we will use in this study is one of spatial competition 
conditional on pupils’ residence: schools compete with other schools for students 
in a community in order to maximise their revenues and minimise the costs 
associated with disruptive and hard-to-teach pupils. Even under a parental-choice 
regime of school provision (model (2) above), a family’s set of available schools is 
constrained by the distance between home and school, in part because of 
commuting costs and in part because school admission rules have historically 
favoured residents who live nearby. Because of this, residential locations differ in 
terms of numbers and accessibility of alternative schools, which in turn means that 
some schools face greater competition from alternatives than do others. Since state 
schools cannot easily change location or vary their price, they can only increase 
their market share by offering a higher quality; these are the competition effects we 
seek in this paper.  
One thing should be clear from the outset: there must be variation in the 
structure of school markets for these ideas to be empirically meaningful. Our 
empirical work considers a large metropolitan area in which there are few explicit 
differences in institutional arrangements that could give rise to different 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, we do not have access to data about how families ranked their school choices. 
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competitive configurations.13 However, our claim is that it is the spatial 
arrangement of schools in relation to each other, and in relation to residential 
housing, which gives rise to de facto variation in school accessibility and market 
structure.14  
The purpose of this empirical work is to assess separately the effect of 
greater school choice and that of greater inter-school competition on pupil 
academic performance. Though these two ideas are conceptually distinct, they can 
be difficult to separate. At the school level, these go hand in hand: markets in 
which parents have a wider choice of schools are markets in which schools face 
greater competition from other schools. Yet for the family, the two concepts are 
distinct. Our definitions are then as follows: choice is a property of residential 
location, and is dependent on the number of alternative schools from which a 
family can choose. Competition is a property of school location, and depends on 
the number of alternatives available to enrolled pupils. So our measurements of 
parental choice are based on the number of schools that, according to our data, are 
available to families living in a given location. Our measurements of competition 
are based on the range of alternatives that are available to pupils attending each 
school. 
Competition/choice indices generally suffer from a number of problems. 
First, they can also capture urban density and school size effects, rather than 
competition and choice. We try to avoid this by carefully designing our measures. 
Secondly, different market configurations can arise through processes of parental 
                                                 
13 This is unlike the markets studied by Hoxby (2000), who considers the number of school 
attendance zones in a jurisdiction. 
14 Of course, this spatial arrangement may be endogenous to pupil performance and this is something 
we consider in our empirical work. 
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choice and school location, which may be endogenous to pupil performance. For 
example, if school places are rationed by place of residence, then parents have 
good reason to move close to popular schools. Schools may then appear 
monopolistic, even though it is parental choice that has compressed the 
geographical spread of their intake. Additionally, although new school openings 
are rare, it is not implausible that the current spatial distribution of schools is 
related to the socioeconomic characteristics of an area and, consequently, its level 
of pupil achievement.15 We address the endogeneity of the competition and choice 
indices using an instrumental variables approach based upon a boundary 
discontinuity, as described below (in Section 4.3). 
To construct our indices (which are described diagrammatically in Figure 1), 
we start by taking advantage of the fact that our data contains information on 
school location and pupil residential location, identified by 6 digit (1 metre) 
coordinates derived from full address postcodes. For each school s, we define its 
travel zone to encompass all residential postcode units that (a) are within the same 
LEA as school s and (b) are contained within a circle drawn around school s at the 
median of the distribution of the home-school distances for the school’s pupils.16 
Our index of school choice availability is derived using our knowledge of a 
pupil’s residential postcode and the travel zones of nearby schools. This index is 
                                                 
15 It has to be emphasized though that school opening has not been common in England in recent 
years and that very few schools were opened in the time window under analysis in our study area. 
Moreover, the location of schools, as well as the geographical distribution of specific school types 
(such as Voluntary Aided or other Faith schools), mainly reflect historical factors.  
16 Using the median means that we are focussing on competition amongst the pupils who live nearest 
to schools. Our results are similar if we use a wider or narrower travel zone, e.g. the 25th or 75th 
percentiles. 
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defined as the number of schools accessible to a pupil, i.e. the number of school 
travel zones that encompass the pupil’s residential postcode, excluding the school 
the pupil actually attends. 
Next, the competition index is school-based and assesses the extent to which 
pupils attending school s, have the option of attending other schools. This 
information is obtained as the average number of schools accessible to pupils in 
the school, i.e. the average of our school choice index across pupils actually 
attending school s.17 
Note that we have experimented with a number of alternative choice and 
competition measures, including the number of alternative schools and number of 
competitors within a fixed radius, and a Herfindahl index of pupil shares in schools 
available within travel zones. These alternatives gave qualitatively similar result, 
but we think our number-of-school indices are conceptually easier to interpret and 
avoid imposing a priori restrictions on travel patterns.  
Finally, the way we define the travel zones used to construct these indices 
means that they are not purely dependent on school density, and hence on 
urbanisation effects. For example, semi-rural and low-density suburban areas can 
(in principle) appear competitive because our definition of school accessibility is 
based on observed pupil travel behaviour: less dense places may exhibit low school 
density, but still be competitive school markets because families can travel longer 
distances more easily. Essentially, the fact that our travel zones are defined by 
revealed preferences allows us to account for heterogeneous travel modes and time, 
and other features of choice patterns that would be obscured by more restrictive 
                                                 
17 In all cases, when we consider pupil numbers, we count all pupils in the age 10-11 cohort who are 
finishing Primary school and taking their Key Stage 2 tests. 
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assumptions such as common travel distances or common travel modes in different 
urban, suburban and semi-rural settings. 
4.2. Modelling school performance 
Our focus is on the influence of these indices on pupil achievements, where these 
are measured by standard test results. One can think of this as the effects of choice 
and/or competition on school productivity (Hoxby, 2003), though we make no 
attempt to evaluate achievements per pound spent.18 As discussed above, more 
competition with other schools and greater exercise of choice amongst potential 
pupils may raise a school’s productivity, because it forces schools to use a more 
efficient teaching technology, or because reallocation of pupils to schools results in 
more efficient pupil-school matches.  
We look for these types of influence by estimating pupil-level educational 
production functions that use information for the extended London metropolitan 
area (described below). The data available to us is rich in geographical detail, with 
information on pupil residential addresses, which makes computation of these 
choice and competition indices feasible. However, at the time of analysis this 
information was only available for two years, leaving us with little useful time-
series variation in the indices and forcing us to adopt an essentially cross-sectional 
approach. 
The inputs into the education production functions include the choice and 
competition indices, alongside a wide range of pupil, school and neighbourhood 
characteristics. The full details of each specification are described in the results 
section below. The outputs of the production function are measures of pupil 
achievement relating to standard tests taken at the end of the Primary phase in 
                                                 
18 Expenditure information at school level is not available to us. 
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English education, at age 10/11. There is little doubt that the outputs of a good 
education amount to more then good results in academic tests. However, tests 
remain the simplest metric by which to judge pupil abilities, and average 
achievement in schools is the most common, if the most basic, means by which 
school performance is assessed. We therefore use test scores as the main measure 
of pupil achievement, and focus on the gain in pupil achievement from age 6/7 to 
age 10/11: this stage is referred to as Key Stage 2 in the English National 
Curriculum. 
To sum up, all our empirical models are more or less restricted versions of 
the following specification: 
1 22 1irst irst rt st irstKS KS c cα β β ε′= + + + +irstx γ  (1) 
 
where 2irstKS  is the age-10/11 test score for pupil i, who lives in postcode r and 
attends school s in year t; 1irstKS  is the age-6/7 test score for pupil i, who lives in 
postcode r and attends school s in year t; rtc  is a choice index for residents of 
postcode r in year t; stc  is a competition index for school s in year t; and finally 
′irstx  is a vector of pupil, school, and neighbourhood characteristics, and a year 
dummy. 
4.3. Accounting for residential sorting: instrumental variables strategy 
Families choose where to live, and schools are one thing they consider when 
making that choice. More generally, where families choose to settle in relation to 
local schools will depend on their own characteristics and preferences, as 
residential sorting arises from the exercise of choice through residential decisions. 
As a consequence, the market structures we observe in our data – which are based 
on the spatial configuration of school and pupil residential locations – may be 
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endogenous in the production of pupil achievements.19 This would be true if, for 
example, families crowded around a high-performing school, reducing its apparent 
competitiveness. It would also be true if the competitive structure was indicative of 
market penetration by a specific school type in areas with specific socioeconomic 
characteristics. Because of these concerns, we need to adopt an instrumental 
variable strategy and look for credible instruments that generate variation in our 
competition and choice indices, but are uncorrelated with unobserved school and 
family characteristics. 
Our indices all assume that residence-school distance is an important factor 
in school choice because of travel costs. The general assumption is that the 
probability of family i attending school j decreases with distance to the school dij. 
Given this, families are (under most conditions) more likely to choose their nearest 
school, as the average distance to alternatives increases (other things being equal). 
To see this, consider the following simple exposition. Suppose family utility from 
attending school j depends on distance dij and the school quality qj, with uij = aqj - 
bdij. Family i attends the nearest school k if aqj – bdij < aqk - bdik for all j, or a(qj – 
qk) < b(dij - dik). Clearly, for given values of qj, qk and dik, the probability of i 
attending k increases as dij increases, for any j. An increase in dik for any j implies 
an increase in the average distance to all alternatives to k (assuming the choice set 
is finite). 
                                                 
19 School choice is also exercised by changing residential location (à la Tiebout, 1956), but the aim in 
our research is to study the effects of school choice and competition taking residential decisions as 
given. Hence our identification strategy will be based on finding variation in school accessibility and 
competition that exists after residential decisions have been made and that is plausibly exogenous to 
family and school characteristics (we will test this assumption). Our estimates of the impact of choice 
and competition are therefore net of any effect arising through Tiebout-type choice. 
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Our instrumentation strategy uses this intuition, exploiting the notion that 
families living near LEA boundaries face longer journeys to schools other than the 
nearest one, than do families living in locations interior to the LEA. The idea is 
best illustrated in Figure 2. The figure shows a linear district with 5 schools k, m, n, 
p, q spaced at equal intervals. Schools k and q are located at the district boundaries 
at the left and right ends of the district respectively. The dashed lines show the cost 
of reaching each school, from each point i along the linear district. The bold line 
shows the average cost of reaching schools other than the nearest school, at any 
point i along the linear district. As can be seen, the average costs of travel to 
schools other than the nearest is higher for residents near the edge than the centre. 
This means that residents near boundaries are more likely to attend their local 
school, i.e. travel costs restrict choice for residents near the district boundary 
relative to those in the centre. A further implication is that the probability that 
school j recruits from the set of families who have j as the nearest school decreases 
with the distance of j from the LEA boundary; so, schools near to LEA boundaries 
will mainly enrol pupils from local families, who have that school as the nearest 
choice.  
In conclusion, schools in locations close to LEA boundaries face less 
competition because: (a) the catchment area shrinks in radius and land area closer 
to LEA boundaries due to local pupils (who face a more restricted choice set) 
crowding out those who would have travelled from further afield; (b) the catchment 
area may be partially truncated on one side, which is a restriction we impose by 
excluding the few pupils who cross LEA boundaries in the calculation of our 
choice and competition indices.20 From these arguments, we propose to use the 
                                                 
20 As it turns out, (a) is most important in terms of driving variation in our indices. 
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distance between a pupil’s home and the LEA boundary as an instrument for 
school choice, and the distance between a school and the LEA boundary as an 
instrument for its level of competitiveness. 
The validity of this strategy rests on a set of assumptions. First, it requires 
that the administrative boundary increases the costs associated with access to 
services on the opposite side of the boundary, so that they actually restrict parental 
choice and school competition.21 Next, we require that the distributions of schools 
and school types, as well as of families, do not follow systematic patterns with 
respect to LEA boundaries; for example, schools (or school types) and households 
should not be more densely distributed around the LEA perimeters than the centre. 
A further assumption is that these LEA-boundary distance instruments do not have 
a direct influence on school or pupil performance other than through their effects 
on the choice set available to families and that they are otherwise uncorrelated with 
the outcomes that are being analysed.22 These are empirical issues regarding the 
power and balancing properties of our instruments which we will investigate in 
detail below when we assess the validity of our strategy. In doing so, we will 
borrow from the methodology used in Cullen et al. (2005). 
                                                 
21 It also assumes that LEA boundaries are exogenously fixed and stable; this seems to be the case, as 
LEA boundaries were last re-drawn in 1997/1998, and even then very few boundaries in the area we 
study were affected.  
22 Similarly, we are assuming that families do not decide to move away from LEA boundaries just 
because they value competition in itself; they just want a good school. Hence, from the parental 
perspective, there is no reason to reside far from LEA boundaries, unless this has a direct impact on 
pupils’ performance. 
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5. Data Sources and Sample Construction 
The empirical analysis employs a number of large and complex data sets, which we 
now describe. The central sources of data for the empirical analysis are the 
combined National Pupil Database (NPD) for 1996 to 2003, the Annual School 
Census (ASC) from 1996 to 2003, and the Pupil Level Annual School Census 
(PLASC) for 2002 and 2003. These are administrative datasets made available by 
the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) of the UK Government.  
The first (NPD) is a pupil-level dataset that records test results obtained by 
pupils at various stages in their school careers. The first set of assessments is 
administered at age 6/7, at the end of what is called Key Stage 1 (KS1) in the 
National Curriculum. The assessment comprises Reading, English and 
Mathematics tests and tasks. Pupils are awarded a level of 0,1,2,3 in each subject 
(with +/- subcategories), and these Levels can be translated into point scores 
according to predetermined DfES rules. The second set of assessments takes place 
at age 10/11, at the end of Key Stage 2 (KS2). The assessment comprises English, 
Maths and Science tests and pupils are awarded percentage marks in each of these; 
marks translate into KS2 Levels 2,3,4,5 (with some +/- subcategories), which in 
turn translate into point scores, again using standard DfES rules. We will use KS2 
and KS1 point score information to compute a value-added measure of educational 
progress between age 6/7 and 10/11. 
The second data set (ASC) collects information on pupil and teacher 
characteristics at school level and is used for resource allocation and other 
administrative purposes by central government.23 ASC was augmented from 2002 
onwards by PLASC, which collects characteristics of pupils individually, including 
                                                 
23 School level characteristics are based on census information covering all grades at Primary schools 
(from age 5 to age 11), so do not relate only to the cohorts in our pupil sample. 
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their residential postcodes. These can be linked to the pupil test results in the NPD 
and to school characteristics in the ASC. So the basis for our composite dataset is 
all pupils in PLASC who took KS2 tests in the school years 2001/2002 and 
2002/2003, and sat their KS1 tests in 1997/1998 and 1998/1999.  
This information can be linked to additional school information, in particular 
school addresses and institution types using the DfES Record of Educational 
Establishments (REE) and Edubase files. Moreover, to compute measures of spatial 
competition using Euclidian distances, we need geographic coordinates for both 
schools and pupils. These are derived from the full address postcodes using 
Ordnance Survey Codepoint data, which provide one metre grid references for 
postcode unit centroids. For some of our analyses we also include information on 
pupil residential neighbourhood and family background, which we obtained by 
matching the residential address to Census data for 2001.24 Finally, we derive LEA 
boundaries from the County and District boundaries obtainable from the UK 
Borders25 geographical information service, which we will use in our instrumental 
variable analysis. 
As stated above, the pupil data we use relates to age-10/11 pupils sitting KS2 
tests in 2001/2-2002/3. The sample is further restricted to pupils living in a 
geographical zone within a 45km radius of central London, defined here as Bank 
tube station in the City of London, and to schools within the same radius.26 Our 
                                                 
24 We identify pupil residential neighbourhoods using postcode sectors; these include a handful of 
postcode tracts and are well designed to represent the community where individuals live. 
25 Available from the Edinburgh University Data Library at www.edina.ac.uk. 
26 We start with a sample within 50km in order to construct our choice and competition indices, but 
base estimation on the subsample within 45km. This avoids us mistakenly inferring lack of 
competition at the boundaries of our geographical zone.  
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purpose in restricting the data is to focus on primarily urban school markets, but it 
also substantially reduces the computational burden. One further restriction is to 
eliminate partial LEAs (Luton, Bracknell) at the margins of our geographical zone, 
and in the City of London (which has a very low pupil population). 
6. Results 
6.1. Sample description 
Table 1 summarises the most important variables in the dataset, namely the pupil 
achievement indicators and competition/choice indices. One key question concerns 
the amount of variation in our competition measures. Clearly, if all schools serve 
only the local community, or if any school within an LEA is easily accessible from 
any residence within an LEA, then there is no variation in the level of competition. 
Our methods assume that a mix of neighbourhood-school and parental-choice 
structures exists, and that this will be reflected in our measures. Table 1 tabulates 
the summary statistics for our indices, Figure 3 graphs their distributions and 
Figure 4 provides a map for part of our study area. These all show there to be 
substantial variation in the indices we have at hand. 
Row 1 of Table 1 shows that, on average, every 10 pupils could quite easily 
reach 14 schools from their home address, in addition to the school they actually 
attend. Remember that this index is based on whether the median travel distance of 
pupils in neighbouring schools encompasses each home address, so that the 
feasible choice set could be quite a lot larger. Averaging this choice index at the 
level of the school in which pupils are enrolled, we derive our competition index 
(Row 4, Table 1). The difference between the pupil and unweighted school mean 
implies that pupils in larger schools tend to be those with more choices. Obviously, 
the choice and competition indices are highly correlated (with a pair-wise 
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correlation of about 0.60); yet they display sufficient independent variation, from 
which we will separately identify the effects of school availability and 
competition.27 Looking at Figure 3, we see that around 1 in 4 pupils have no school 
(other than the one they attend) within a short travel distance, but only 1 in 10 
schools have all pupils with no local alternatives. It is also worth noting that only 
48% of Community school pupils and 27% of Faith school pupils in our study area 
actually attend their nearest school within their LEA, so there is clearly 
considerable exercising of choice (see also Burgess et al., 2004). Finally, from the 
map of Figure 4, we can also deduce that the competition indices are only partly 
related to urban centrality and density: some of the highest values of our index 
occur in suburban districts such as Barnet and Brent, whilst inner-city zones like 
south Hackney or Southwark exhibit low levels of competition.  
Further down Table 1 are other interesting features of the data. The median 
travel distance of Primary school pupils in our study area is 743 metres, and this 
travel zone is home to an average of 80 pupils, though the number ranges widely.28 
We have also computed a cohort density measure centred on each pupil’s 
residential postcode, using a count of the number of pupils aged 10/11 within a 
564m radius of each pupil’s address (a 1km2 circle). The mean pupil density is 
64.1km-2, but ranges between 1 and 256. These inter-school distance and 
population density variables do not feature in our competition or choice indices, 
but are used as controls for more general urban density factors in our regression 
models. In addition, we will include a number of controls in these regressions, at 
                                                 
27 This is because, for example, pupils coming from an area with little available choice may travel 
long distances and enrol in a school which faces a highly competitive market. 
28 The average distance between a school and other schools in its travel zone is about 600 metres, 
ranging from zero (i.e. two or more schools are in the same postcode) up to 4.4 km. 
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four levels of aggregation: pupil, school, residential postcode sector, and LEA 
level.29 These are described in Appendix Table A2. 
6.2. Choice, competition and performance: regression results 
Our first results are ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the model in 
equation 1, which are presented in Table 2. This shows the coefficients of interest 
only, and is divided into three panels. The top panel shows estimates of the 
association between choice availability and pupil achievement, unconditional on 
the index of competition at the pupil’s school ( 1β  in equation 1, with 2β  restricted 
to zero). The next panel shows the association between school competition and 
pupil achievement ( 2β  in equation 1, with 1β  restricted to zero). The third panel 
reports the coefficients with both choice and competition indices included together 
( 1β  and 2β unrestricted). All columns report results where the dependent variable is 
the pupil’s change in point scores between KS1 and KS2, a direct measure of value 
added through the National Curriculum stages. Table A3 in the Appendix reports 
results for KS2 English and Maths test marks separately. As we did not find 
different patterns for the two subjects, we decided to focus on the overall value-
added measures.30 Finally, notice that it is difficult to establish a priori at which 
                                                 
29 Along with school type dummies (Community, Foundation, Voluntary Aided and Voluntary 
Controlled). 
30 Controlling for prior achievement, or using achievement growth, risks underestimating the effect of 
fixed school characteristics, because prior achievement is determined by school characteristics too. 
Unfortunately the coefficient on prior achievement is also endogenous (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003) 
and potentially downward biased. Nevertheless such specifications are commonplace and we follow 
tradition. Since we have no instruments for prior achievement which would allow us to correct the 
specification we simply note here that the coefficients on our competition and choice indices are 
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level one should cluster standard errors; therefore, we report both standard errors 
clustered at school and LEA level (in round and square brackets respectively). 
Looking at the OLS results in the first panel of Table 2, it seems clear that 
there is an association between the number of choices a pupil has available locally 
and their achievement at school between age 7 and 11. This is true regardless of 
whether we include the full set of controls described above. However, the 
association is very small in magnitude: one extra school in the pupil choice set 
relates to about 0.1 additional value-added points. These results are qualitatively 
similar when we look at the school competition index on its own in the next panel. 
This is unsurprising, since the choice and competition indices are positively 
correlated. Finally, when the choice and competition indices are included together, 
we find that pupils in schools facing more competition do marginally better; yet we 
find that choice is not associated with higher pupil performance.31 
Taken at face value, these estimates suggest small but significant gains for 
pupils in schools facing more competitive markets. However, we find it hard to 
trust these findings, because the choice and competition indices we use are likely to 
be endogenous to pupil and school performance. To address this, we employ the 
instrumental variables (IV) strategy described above, using the pupil residence-
LEA boundary distance as an instrument for choice, and the school-LEA boundary 
distance as an instrument for competition.  
                                                                                                                            
almost unchanged if we use age-11 test scores unconditional on age-7 test scores. See Table A2 in the 
Appendix. 
31 We also assessed whether the impact of competition/choice mainly comes from under- or over-
capacity schools. Our results suggest that: (a) competition always matters more than choice; (b) most 
of the effect comes from schools that have a potential for expansion (under-capacity). This “threat 
effect” is in line with predictions from the empirical IO literature. 
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The IV coefficient estimates are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, 
and tell a very different story. The signs on all the coefficients become negative, 
although statistically insignificant.32 Starting from the top panel, there is now no 
evidence to suggest that an increase in the number of schools available near a 
pupil’s home (as we move away from an LEA boundary) improves pupil 
achievement. A Hausman test of the hypothesis that the IV coefficient on the 
choice index in column (4) is equal to the OLS estimate of column (2) rejects the 
null with a p-value of 0.0363. Notice that this coefficient identifies an average 
effect of school availability, i.e. both for individuals who exercise choice and opt 
out of their local schools, and for individuals who are left in the local institution. 
Without further assumptions, we cannot disentangle a pure pupil-school matching 
effect from indirect spill-over effects. Similarly, we do not find evidence that 
attendance at a school that faces more competition further away from an LEA 
boundary improves achievement (central panel). The IV coefficient for the 
competition index is always negative, though not significant, and a test that the IV 
estimate in column (4) is equal to the OLS coefficient in column (2) rejects the null 
with a p-value of 0.0481. Finally, when we include the choice and competition 
indices together in our regressions (bottom panel), we come to similar conclusions: 
neither increased choice nor fiercer competition away from LEA boundaries 
significantly increases pupil achievement. A test on the two IV coefficients in 
column (4) being jointly equal to the OLS estimates in column (2) speaks against 
the null with a p-value of 0.0869. In conclusion, all these point estimates suggest 
that moves away from an LEA boundary could have small adverse effects on 
achievement, though they are imprecisely determined. 
                                                 
32 Remarkably, our results are similar whether we include the full set of controls or not; this reassures 
us as to the validity of our instrumental variable approach. 
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6.3. Assessing the instrumental variables strategy 
It is reasonable to ask whether, given these results, LEA boundary distance 
measures are good instruments for the choice and competition indices. An 
important assumption for the instrument to determine choice and competition is 
that cross-LEA Primary school attendance is not widespread. From the Pupil 
Census data we have established that the proportion of entry-age children (age-4) 
attending schools in an LEA outside their home LEA is only around 5.5%, and 
slightly lower for Community schools at around 4.7%. Moreover, of the 10% of 
pupils who live closest to the LEA boundaries, well over 80% attend Primary 
schools within their own LEA. This is particularly reassuring, as these pupils are 
typically in postcodes that are immediately adjacent to the boundary and might be 
equally likely to attend a school in the adjacent LEA as in their own LEA if the 
boundary imposed no barrier. 
Whilst this suggests that our distance measures could be good predictors of 
school choice and competition, the deciding factor on the power of these 
instruments boils down to whether the first stages of the IV regressions are 
effective. These are tabulated in Table 3, where we report results for specifications 
including and excluding controls, and with standard errors clustered at school or 
LEA level. The instruments – the log of boundary distances – are always very 
powerful. A 10% increase in the distance from LEA boundary to pupil residence 
increases the number of schools in the pupil’s choice set by 0.027, or about 2% 
relative to the mean (0.027/1.404). A 10% increase in LEA boundary-school 
distance increases the average number of alternative schools for pupils in that 
school by about 0.02. The instruments are individually significant and the F-
statistic for the joint test of the instruments is always high (Staiger and Stock, 
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1997). In a nutshell, LEA boundary distance measures are indeed strong predictors 
of choice availability and school competition. 
Further results (not tabulated) also show that the instrument for choice (and 
indirectly, competition) works in line with the theoretical reasoning we used to 
justify its use. First, for each 1% increase in distance between a pupil’s residence 
and the nearest LEA boundary there is a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the 
probability that the pupil attends the nearest school (controlling for the average 
pupil-boundary distance within the LEA). Secondly, the average distance between 
a pupil’s residence and the nearest 4 schools (other than the one he or she actually 
attends, and within the LEA of residence) decreases by 0.06% for each 1% increase 
in the distance between their home and the boundary. In other words, pupils near 
admissions-district boundaries seem to be more constrained in their choice of 
school. Finally, we dropped the restriction of no-LEA-crossing to compute our 
indices, and reran the IV analysis (presented in Appendix Table A4, columns (1) 
and (2)). First stage results show that distances to LEA boundaries are still strong 
predictors of competition and choice. As explained before, we expect the 
instruments to work if boundaries are effective barriers, even if we include 
boundary-crossers (very few) in our indices. This is because the composition of the 
intake in a less-competitive school close to an LEA boundary will be weighted 
towards restricted-choice pupils living in the immediate vicinity. This shrinks the 
catchment area radius relative to schools located more centrally within the LEA, 
and so influences the choice and competition indices in the surrounding area. 
One further concern relates to the fact that some of the variation in our 
choice and competition indices could be generated by differences in how far pupils 
travel to school, a factor which is plausibly correlated with preferences over 
schooling and family resources. For instance, looking at Figure 2, if pupils differ in 
terms of their transport costs (e.g. some have cars and some do not), then those 
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with the lowest costs per unit of travel distance will be best placed to exercise 
choice and attend the most competitive schools. In other words, home-school 
distance is a potentially important omitted variable when we use our boundary-
distance IV strategy. However, our instrumental variable strategy does not 
systematically rely on differences in travel distance to identify the causal effect of 
school competition on pupil achievement. It instead contrasts pupils living in the 
same neighbourhood but travelling in different directions: towards the centre of the 
LEA or towards a boundary (for example, looking again at Figure 2, our 
competition instrument compares pupils who live at, say, p and attend a school at 
q, with others who live at p but attend a school at n). We do not think there is a 
strong theoretical case for individual unobservable characteristics being related to 
direction of travel. Nevertheless, in order to directly address this issue, in columns 
(3) and (4) of Appendix Table A4 we replicate our IV analysis controlling for the 
distance between home and the school a pupil actually attends. The results are 
essentially unchanged and this set of estimates confirms our previous findings, 
suggesting that differences in costs or preferences associated with home-school 
travel distance are not biasing our estimates. 
Finally, one crucial assumption behind our strategy is that school or 
residence distance from LEA boundaries is uncorrelated with unobserved pupil and 
school characteristics that may influence educational outcomes. This assumption 
might be violated if, for example, there were geographical differences between 
places close to LEA boundaries and places further away, and residential sorting led 
to differences in the distributions of pupil characteristics in these areas. Although 
this assumption is ultimately untestable, we can provide some evidence in support 
of it by demonstrating that our instruments are not strongly correlated with 
observable school and residential neighbourhood characteristics. To do so, we 
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borrow from the methodology in Cullen et al. (2005) and perform balancing tests 
for the two instruments separately. Results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
In the first of the two tables, we investigate the validity of the instrument for 
school choice. The aim is to test whether the distance between home and the LEA 
boundary (relative to the mean within the LEA) is correlated with the level and 
diversity of various neighbourhood attributes that might in turn be linked to family 
background and hence pupil performance at school.  Since we are concerned 
primarily with factors that are unobserved in our models, we test whether the 
distance between pupil residence and the LEA boundary (or rather its natural 
logarithm) is correlated with various neighbourhood characteristics not included as 
controls in our specifications, both conditional on these controls and 
unconditionally. These are derived from the UK Census 2001, from the UK Land 
Registry and from our pupil and school datasets. We implement these tests by 
aggregating all data to the postcode-sector33 level (about 2500 households), 
calculating the distance from the LEA boundary to the postcode sector centroid34 
and regressing each neighbourhood characteristic separately on neighbourhood-
LEA boundary distance, both with and without controls. 
The regression coefficients and standard errors from this analysis are in 
column (1) and (2) of Table 4. The neighbourhood attributes considered are: the 
                                                 
33 Full UK postcodes are typically of the form AB# #CD, where # is numeric. Deleting the last two 
characters generates a postcode sector code. At this level we can calculate means and standard 
deviations of the characteristics recorded in our pupil and school data at the full postcode level (10 or 
so households), and in the UK Census at the Census Output Area  level (around 50-100 households). 
34 The reasons for this aggregation are: (a) we are interested in potential within-neighbourhood 
heterogeneity in pupil characteristics and housing prices as well as differences in means; and (b) the 
neighbourhood controls in our regressions are at this geographical level. See footnote 24 above. 
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dispersion of school achievement of peers in the neighbourhood (standard 
deviation of KS1 grades);35 the number of private schools; the average and 
standard deviation of log house prices; the fractions of adult individuals working 
and economically active in the neighbourhood; the fractions of adults retired from 
work and sick or disabled in the neighbourhood; and a measure for the 
homogeneity of educational attainment of adults in the neighbourhood (a 
Herfindhal index). Descriptive statistics are reported in column (3), and the number 
of available observations is reported in column (4) of Table 4; the latter varies 
between 1133 and 1181 due to some missing values. Whether or not we include the 
full set of controls in the regression, we find neither significant nor sizable 
relationships between any these measures and the distance between residential 
neighbourhood and the LEA boundary.36  
In Table 5 we repeat this analysis, this time aggregating our data to school 
level and regressing school level characteristics on school-LEA boundary distance. 
The aim here is to test the validity of the instrument for our competition index, 
which varies only across schools, by checking whether the characteristics of 
                                                 
35 We do not report tests that relate age-7 (KS1) pupil achievement to LEA boundary distances, 
because these are used to construct our value-added measures. Nevertheless, we found no significant 
evidence that early-age grades are related to school or home distances from school district boundaries. 
36 In line with the analysis so far, we cluster standard errors at the LEA level to take care of potential 
spatial correlation of observations across different postcode sector within localised areas (LEAs). 
However, one should also note that the outcomes in each equation are potentially correlated with each 
other within postcode sectors, suggesting that a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions setup might 
improve efficiency. In fact, as the set of controls is identical in each equation, SURE does not provide 
any more information than OLS, even though the SURE and OLS estimates are marginally different 
because of differing sample sizes in each regression. In any case, we have tried a SURE approach and 
this led to almost identical conclusions. 
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schools located close to district boundaries differ systematically from those further 
away. We consider a number of school characteristics. First, we compute a 
measure of the dispersion of achievement of peers based on age-7 grades of pupils 
in the cohort under analysis (standard deviation of KS1 grades within school), 
averaged over the two years in our sample. Then, using age-7 grades of pupils in 
the two cohorts immediately adjacent to those in our sample (i.e. pupils aged 7 in 
1999/2000 and 2000/2001), we compute school averages of KS1 grades and 
dispersion of early-stage attainment within school (the standard deviation of KS1 
grades); we again average these over the two years.37 Next, using Annual School 
Census information, we construct two measures of the ratio of support staff to 
qualified teachers for the schools across all different stages (i.e. overall, from age 5 
to age 11). Finally, we measure distances from schools to main roads and the 
number of schools within 1km (including those across LEA boundaries). These 
school-level regression results, with and without controls, are reported in columns 
(1) and (2) in Table 5. Descriptive statistics and the number of observations for 
these variables are reported in columns (3) and (4). Once more, we find no 
evidence for a significant association between these variables and our instrument.38  
                                                 
37 Unfortunately, we do not have access to the information required to compute these two indices for 
cohorts younger than those in our sample. 
38 We have tested explicitly whether students’ characteristics are correlated with the boundary-to-
school distance of the school that they attend. To do so, we regressed pupil characteristics on the log 
of the school-to-boundary distance in the pupil-level dataset, both with and without residential 
postcode fixed effects. In no case could we find any significant association between pupil 
characteristics and the school-to-boundary distance. This evidence rules out family decisions about 
direction of travel to school (towards or away from the LEA boundary) as a potential unobserved 
source of correlation between our instrument and pupil achievement.  
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Everything here indicates that both choice and competition in Primary 
schooling increase exogenously as pupils and schools move away from LEA 
boundaries. In support of the assumption discussed above, we find that our distance 
measures do not simply capture features of schools next to LEA boundaries, nor do 
they reflect other neighbourhood characteristics which may have a direct influence 
on school or pupil performance. However, results in Table 2 show no systematic 
impact of choice and competition on pupil performance. The natural interpretation 
of this is that the positive, but small, association between pupil performance and 
competition indices seen in the ordinary least squares estimates is attributable to 
endogenous pupil sorting. 
6.4. Heterogeneous effects: majority vs. non-majority controlled schools 
The difference between the OLS and IV estimates in Table 2 clearly warrants 
further exploration, and it is to this that we now turn. As we discussed in Section 3, 
there are important institutional differences between state-funded Primary schools 
in England, particularly in terms of governance and admissions procedures. These 
distinctions may be important when considering how different school types react to 
school competition incentives. At one extreme, “majority controlled” Voluntary 
Aided schools are likely to be highly responsive to competition. The foundation or 
charitable institution that owns the school premises has majority representation on 
the Governing body and so has a strong influence over the running of the school. 
Because Voluntary Aided schools are also directly responsible for their own pupil 
admissions, and since funding is linked to pupil numbers, strategies promoting 
excellence, monitoring performance and rewarding outstanding teaching will be 
promoted as a means to attract pupils. In other school types, governance is shared 
more equally between LEA representatives, teaching staff and parents, and the 
school foundation; as a result, less emphasis will be placed on targets and 
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innovative teaching methods, and more on balancing a range of different 
objectives. Furthermore, admissions to “non-majority controlled” schools are more 
tightly controlled by the Local Education Authority (either directly or via the 
Governing Body), which may have an incentive to reallocate some pupils whose 
preferred schools are over-subscribed to schools that are under-subscribed. These 
institutional arrangements clearly have the potential to weaken the link between 
parental choice, school competition and pupil achievement. 
Given these considerations, we now separately examine pupils in “majority 
controlled” schools and pupils in “non-majority controlled” schools (Community, 
Voluntary Controlled and Foundations), and study whether choice and competition 
have different effects for these two subgroups. Results are reported in Table 6. 
Columns (1) and (3) present OLS results for majority and non-majority controlled 
institutions respectively. For both school types, we still find that choice is not 
significantly associated with pupil achievement. More interestingly, we find that 
competition is positively related to performance in “majority controlled” schools, 
but that this is not the case for schools where governance is more under LEA 
control. While this suggests that competition may improve average achievement 
for pupils in schools that, we have argued, are likely to be more responsive to 
incentives, it may also be driven by the endogeneity of the choice and competition 
indices to pupil and school performance.  
To address this issue, we reproduce our IV strategy for these two groups; 
results are presented in column (2) and (4) of Table 6. First stage statistics reported 
at the bottom of the table show that our instruments based on school and residence 
distance to LEA boundaries are still effective for the two groups separately. Yet the 
IV coefficients for the effect of school competition on pupil achievement have 
opposite signs for majority and non-majority controlled institutions. For the latter 
we find a small, negative and marginally significant association between 
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competition and achievement. One additional competitor (about one standard 
deviation of our competition index) is associated with 0.893 point lower value-
added, accounting for about 10% of its standard-deviation. However, we find a 
sizeable and positive impact of school competition on pupil achievement for 
majority-controlled schools. While this is only significant at the 10% level, the 
effect is quite large: the competition threat associated with one extra school 
available to pupils increases the value-added by 1.6 points, accounting for more 
than 20% of its standard deviation. A test for the IV coefficients on the choice and 
competition indices being simultaneously equal across the two sub-groups does not 
provide strong support for the null, with a p-value of 0.0503; more interestingly, 
when we test only whether the IV estimates of the effect of school competition are 
the same for the two groups, we strongly reject this hypothesis with a p-value of 
0.0195. 
Overall, these findings support the existence of a beneficial effect of 
competition on pupil achievement in a setting in which schools combine more 
responsive governance (mainly via institutional arrangements) with greater 
autonomy in admission procedures. It should be emphasized that these schools are 
a relatively important group in the state Primary education system, enrolling more 
than 20% of the pupils. However, a more conservative interpretation should take 
into account the possibility that competition may come at the cost of lower pupil 
attainment in schools that do not benefit from independence and flexibility in their 
management, potentially increasing school segregation along the lines of pupil 
attainment. This divergence in results between “majority controlled” and “non-
majority controlled” schools suggests that school competition might not be “a 
rising tide that lifts all boats” (Hoxby, 2003). 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have attempted to identify the causal links between choice and 
competition and the academic achievement of Primary school pupils. To do so we 
have carefully constructed measures of the Primary school choices available to 
pupils based on the equilibrium accessibility of schools to their homes. From this 
we also derived competition measures for the schools at which these pupils are 
enrolled. Choice and competition indices were related to pupil achievements in 
Primary schools, first in a simple least squares setting and then using an 
instrumental variables approach based on a boundary discontinuity affecting school 
attendance. 
Simple least squares results show a small positive association between 
school competition and achievement: pupils tend to do better if they are enrolled in 
schools that serve more competitive markets. Yet we found little evidence that it is 
competition that drives the gain in achievement; pupil sorting, endogenous travel 
patterns, and school location provide more plausible explanations for these 
findings. Once endogeneity issues are controlled for, pupil achievement is 
generally unrelated to the competitive pressures a school faces. It is only in 
“majority controlled” schools, which have more freedom in governance and 
admission practices, that competition appears to be positively linked to 
performance. This is likely to be attributable to their potentially more responsive 
institutional arrangements and to factors like proactive governance and religious 
fervour. However, there is weaker evidence that school competition might be 
detrimental to pupil learning in schools in which governance is shared more 
equally among stakeholders and the Local Educational Authority retains more 
control over school management, teacher recruitment, and admissions. 
These findings matter for the often heated debate about whether choice and 
competition improve pupil performance. There is some comfort here for advocates 
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of choice and competition as pathways to higher educational standards: our 
evidence suggests that competition may improve school performance for some of 
the one-in-five students who attend Voluntary Aided schools. However, our results 
cast some doubt on the general effectiveness of choice and competition in the 
school context: they imply that such pressures only operate in a specific subset of 
the Primary school market and possibly at the cost of polarisation of schools along 
the dimension of pupil achievement. There are, of course, a number of other issues 
that could usefully be studied here. For example, we do not consider competition 
from private schools (largely for data reasons); nor can we study parental 
preferences in any direct way. Incorporating these factors into future work (both 
theoretical and applied) would seem to be a useful direction in which to go. 
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Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the choice and competition measures 
 
 
Note: Numbers 0,1,2,3 indicate the choice index that would be assigned to pupils living in each area (assuming 
they attend school s) 
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Figure 2: Illustration of the instrumentation strategy 
 
 
Note: Figure shows a linear district with 5 schools, k, m, n, p, q; dij is the distance to each school; id  is the 
average distance to schools other than the nearest. 
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Figure 3: Distributions of the choice and competition indices 
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Figure 4: Primary school competition in the Greater London Area 
 
Note: Figure shows local averages of the school-level competition index (Inverse Distance Weighted means of the nearest 6 schools on a 250m raster). Each shading class corresponds to intervals [0,1], (1,2], 
…(6,7] from lighter to darker. 
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Table 1: Choice, competition and pupil achievement: summary statistics 
  Variable Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Min, Max 
     
Number of schools accessible to pupil 201034 1.40 1.21 0, 10 
Number of schools accessible to pupils enrolled in 
majority controlled schools 
42993 1.58 1.29 0, 10 
Number of schools accessible to pupils enrolled in non-
majority controlled schools 
144002 1.35 1.18 0, 10 
Average number of schools accessible to pupils in school 201034 1.31 0.99 0, 8.31 
Average number of schools accessible to pupils enrolled 
in majority controlled schools 
42993 1.57 1.03 0, 6.73 
Average number of schools accessible to pupils enrolled 
in non-majority controlled schools 
144002 1.24 0.97 0, 8.31 
Median travel distance all schools 201034 743.71 455.37 102, 6157 
Median travel distance, majority controlled schools 42993 1096.59 616.78 146, 6157 
Median travel distance, non-majority controlled schools 144002 647.16 341.49 102, 4303 
Number of pupils in the travel area 201034 79.81 71.83 2, 1015 
Pupil density (Number of pupils per hectare) 201034 0.64 0.37 0.01, 2.56 
KS2-1 Value Added 201034 38.61 8.17 -4, 90 
  KS2-1 Value Added, majority controlled schools 42993 39.14 7.67 2, 84 
  KS2-1 Value Added, non-majority controlled schools 144002 38.46 8.30 -4, 90 
Note: Majority controlled schools are Voluntary Aided schools where the school foundation has at least fifty percent of the votes in 
the school Governing Body; non-majority controlled schools are Community, Voluntary Controlled and Foundation schools where 
no single stakeholder has a majority share in the governing body. 
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Table 2: Primary school choice, competition and pupil achievement; Key Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3 
 Total value-added points 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
Choice index entered separately     
Number of schools accessible to  
pupil’s home 
0.103 
(0.038)** 
0.098 
(0.036)** 
-0.244 
(0.195) 
-0.305 
(0.196) 
 [0.060] [0.035] [0.257] [0.266] 
     
Competition index entered separately     
Average number of schools accessible to pupils in 
the school 
0.195 
(0.066)** 
0.172 
(0.070)* 
-0.386 
(0.325) 
-0.488 
(0.341) 
 [0.087] [0.066] [0.390] [0.417] 
     
Choice and competition together     
Number of schools accessible to 
pupil’s home 
0.011 
(0.025) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
-0.036 
(0.168) 
-0.065 
(0.176) 
 [0.040] [0.032] [0.172] [0.187] 
Average number of schools accessible to pupils in 
the school 
0.186 
(0.066)** 
0.147 
(0.070)* 
-0.361 
(0.350) 
  -0.463 
(0.373) 
 [0.083] [0.073] [0.390] [0.417] 
     
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Number of schools 2412 2412 2412 2412 
Observations 201034 201034 201034 201034 
Note: Regressions at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on schools in round parenthesis: *, significant at 5%; **, significant at 
1%. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in square brackets (there are 42 LEAs in the area under analysis). Controls include 
pupil median travel distance and number of pupils in travel area (Table 1), dummies for school type (Community, Foundation, and 
Voluntary Aided; Voluntary Controlled as excluded category) and variables listed in Appendix Table A2. Missing Postcode Sector 
Level and LEA Level variables recoded to zeros; dummies for missing Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level observations included 
in the specifications. Instruments in columns (3) and (4) are as follows. Top panel, choice only: log of distance between pupil home 
and LEA boundary, controlling for LEA average of log distance between pupil home and LEA boundary. Central panel, competition 
only: log of distance between school and LEA boundary, controlling for LEA average of log distance between school and LEA 
boundary. Bottom panel, choice and competition: log of distance between school and LEA boundary and pupil home and LEA 
boundary, controlling for LEA average of log distance between school and LEA boundary and LEA average of log distance between 
pupil home and LEA boundary. 
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Table 3: First stage results:  
Primary school choice and competition, and distance to LEA boundaries  
  Models  without controls Models with controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  School level  
clustered S.E. 
LEA level  
clustered S.E. 
School level  
clustered S.E. 
LEA level  
clustered S.E. 
Choice index entered separately  
Coeff. on log. of pupil residence- 
LEA boundary distance 
 0.253 
 (0.012)** 
0.253 
(0.036)** 
0.249 
(0.011)** 
0.249 
(0.034)** 
F-Statistics 
[p-value] 
 426.91 
[0.0000] 
48.55 
[0.0000] 
523.77 
[0.0000] 
54.06 
[0.0000] 
Partial R2 on excluded instrument  0.0421 0.0421 0.0442 0.0442 
 
Competition index entered separately 
Coeff on log. of school- 
LEA boundary distance 
 0.212  
(0.022)** 
0.212 
(0.031)** 
0.205  
(0.020)** 
0.205 
(0.032)** 
F-Statistics 
[p-value] 
 95.27 
 [0.0000] 
46.42 
[0.0000] 
101.20 
[0.0000] 
41.96 
[0.0000] 
Partial R2 on excluded instrument  0.0411 0.0411 0.0437 0.0440 
  
Competition and choice indices together 
  
Choice index first stage equation 
Coeff. on log. of pupil residence- 
LEA boundary distance (Own)  
 0.282  
(0.011)** 
0.282 
(0.030)** 
0.270 
(0.009)** 
0.270 
(0.028)** 
Coeff. on log. of school- 
LEA boundary distance (Cross) 
 -0.048 
(0.015)** 
-0.048 
(0.015)** 
-0.036  
(0.014)* 
-0.036 
(0.015)* 
F-Statistics 
[p-value] 
 350.99  
[0.0000] 
83.53 
[0.0000] 
407.21 
[0.0000] 
72.63 
[0.0000] 
Partial R2 on excluded instruments  0.0436 0.0436 0.0448 0.0448 
 
Competition index first stage equation 
Coeff. on log. of school- 
LEA boundary distance (Own) 
 0.198 
(0.024)** 
0.198 
(0.029)** 
0.191 
(0.022)** 
0.191 
(0.032)** 
Coeff. on log. of pupil residence- 
LEA boundary distance (Cross) 
 0.023 
(0.013)* 
0.023 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.011)* 
0.021 
(0.011) 
F-Statistics 
[p-value] 
 55.01  
[0.0000] 
23.19 
[0.0000] 
57.47 
[0.0000] 
21.55 
[0.0001] 
Partial R2 on excluded instruments  0.0420 0.0420 0.0439 0.0441 
Note: Regressions at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on schools in round parenthesis in columns (1) and (3); standard 
errors clustered at the LEA level in round parenthesis in columns (2) and (4). *, significant at 5%; **, significant at 1%. Controls 
include pupil median travel distance and number of pupils in travel area (Table 1), dummies for school type (Community, 
Foundation, and Voluntary Aided; Voluntary Controlled as excluded category) and variables listed in Appendix Table A2. Missing 
Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level variables recoded to zeros; dummies for missing Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level 
observations included in the specifications. Top panel (choice only) also controls for LEA average of log distance between pupil 
home and LEA boundary. Central panel (competition only) also controls for LEA average of log distance between school and LEA 
boundary. Bottom panel (choice and competition) also controls for LEA average of log distance between school and LEA boundary 
and LEA average of log distance between pupil home and LEA boundary. Number of observations: 201034; number of schools 
2412. 
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Table 4: Pupil home-LEA boundary distance and neighbourhood characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable List: Reg.Coefficients, 
No Controls 
Reg.Coefficients, 
With Controls 
Mean 
(Std.Dev) 
N. Obs. 
     
Std.Dev of KS1 grades, 
within postcode sector 
-0.076 
(0.103) 
-0.099 
(0.109) 
10.464 
(1.933) 
1133 
Number of independent (Private) 
schools, within postcode sector 
0.077 
(0.045) 
0.045 
(0.038) 
0.451 
(0.912) 
1181 
Average house prices,  
within postcode sector  
-0.002 
(0.027) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
0.202 
(0.357) 
1152 
Std.Dev. house prices,  
within postcode sector 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.387 
(0.105) 
1152 
Fraction of individuals economically 
active, within postcode sector 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.686 
(0.686) 
1144 
Fraction of individuals working full 
time, within postcode sector 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.428 
(0.060) 
1144 
Fraction of individuals retired from 
work, within postcode sector 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.111 
(0.035) 
1140 
Fraction of sick and disabled 
individuals, within postcode sector 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.041 
(0.021) 
1140 
Educational homogeneity 
(Herfindhal index), within postcode 
sector 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000  
(0.002) 
0.234 
(0.051) 
1144 
Note: Regression coefficients obtained from separate regressions of listed variable on log of distance between pupil home and LEA 
boundary; regressions at the postcode sector level. Standard errors clustered on LEA in round parenthesis; no regression coefficients 
significant at conventional levels. Controls in column (1) only include year dummies and LEA average of log distance between 
pupil home and LEA boundary; column (2) additionally includes the usual controls detailed above (see note to Table 2). All controls 
averaged at the postcode level. Herfindahl Index is constructed over the following 6 categories: missing qualification; no 
qualification, Level-1 qualifications; Level-2 qualifications; Level-3 qualifications; Level -4 or -5 qualifications. 
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Table 5: School-LEA boundary distance and school characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable List: Reg.Coefficients, 
No Controls 
Reg.Coefficients, 
With Controls 
Mean 
(Std.Dev) 
N. Obs. 
     
Std.Dev. of KS1 grades,  
within school, sample cohorts 
-0.011 
(0.034) 
0.048 
(0.030) 
10.346 
(1.565) 
2412 
Average  KS1 grades,  
within school, younger two cohorts 
0.105  
(0.095) 
-0.010 
(0.066) 
45.162  
(4.358) 
1946 
Std.Dev. of KS1 grades,  
within school, younger two cohorts 
-0.007 
(0.040) 
0.032 
(0.035) 
10.560 
(1.728) 
1946 
SEN support teacher  
to total pupil ratio 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.589 
(0.602) 
2412 
Ethnic minorities support  
teacher to total pupil ratio 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.059 
(0.158) 
2412 
Log distance to  
main roads 
0.023 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.026) 
6.596 
(1.161) 
2412 
Number of other schools within 1km, 
controlling for LEA school density 
0.038 
(0.044) 
0.019 
(0.034) 
3.389 
(3.144) 
2412 
Note: Regression coefficients obtained from separate regressions of listed variable on log of distance between school and LEA 
boundary; regressions at the school level. Robust standard errors (equivalent to standard errors clustered on school) in round 
parenthesis; no regression coefficients significant at conventional levels. Sample cohorts: pupils aged 7 in 1997/1998 and 
1998/1999; younger two cohorts: pupils aged 7 in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001. SEN means Special Educational Needs. Controls in 
column (1) only include year dummies and LEA average of log distance between school and LEA boundary; column (2) additionally 
includes the usual controls detailed above (see note to Table 2). All controls averaged at the school level. 
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Table 6: Primary school choice, competition and pupil achievement; Key Stage 2, 2001/2-
2002/3: pupils in majority controlled and non-majority controlled schools separately 
 Majority controlled  schools  Non-majority controlled  schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
     
Number of schools 
accessible to 
pupil’s home 
0.027  
(0.040) 
0.045 
 (0.250) 
0.038  
(0.030) 
-0.029  
(0.220) 
 [0.044] [0.247] [0.041] [0.209] 
Average number of 
schools accessible to  
pupils in the school 
0.378  
(0.120)** 
1.625 
(0.968) 
0.094  
(0.085) 
-0.893 
(0.474) 
 [0.141] [1.073] [0.082] [0.601] 
     
F-Statistics  
[p-value] 
    
Choice equation --       136.28 
[0.0000] 
--    280.70 
[0.0000] 
Competition equation --      6.06 
[0.0023] 
--   39.57 
[0.0000] 
Partial-R2     
Choice equation -- 0.0394 -- 0.0441 
Competition equation -- 0.0185 -- 0.0386 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of schools 641 641 1771 1771 
Observations 43189 43189 157845 157845 
Note: Regressions at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school in round parenthesis: *, significant at 5%; **, significant at 
1%. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in square brackets (there are 42 LEAs in the area under analysis). First stage statistics 
for models with standard errors clustered at the school level. Controls include pupil median travel distance and number of pupils in 
travel area (Table 1) and variables listed in Appendix Table A2. Columns (3) and (4) also include dummies for school type 
(Community and Foundation; Voluntary Controlled as excluded category). Missing Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level variables 
recoded to zeros; dummies for missing Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level observations included in the specifications. 
Instruments in columns (2) and (4) are log of distance between school and LEA boundary and between pupil home and LEA 
boundary, controlling for LEA average of log distance between school and LEA boundary and LEA average of log distance between 
pupil home and LEA boundary. Majority controlled schools include Voluntary Aided schools; non-majority controlled schools 
include Community, Voluntary Controlled and Foundation schools. 
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Appendix: Additional Tables 
Table A1: Primary school categories in England 
Type Faith Governors Admissions 
authority 
Assets owned by Employer 
Non- Majority Controlled  Schools 
Community Secular Parents >30% 
LEA 20% 
Staff <30% 
Community 20% 
LEA LEA LEA 
Voluntary 
Controlled 
Mostly C. of E., 
some other faith, 
some secular 
Foundation <25% 
Parents >30% 
LEA <20% 
Staff <30% 
Community 10% 
LEA LEA LEA 
Foundation Mostly secular, 
some C. of E., 
Foundation <25% 
Parents >30% 
LEA <20% 
Staff <30% 
Community 10% 
Governors Church or 
charity 
Governors 
Majority Controlled Schools 
Voluntary 
Aided 
Mostly C. of E. or 
Catholic, some 
secular 
Foundation >50% 
Parents >30% 
LEA <10% 
Staff (<30%) 
Governors Church or 
charity 
Governors 
Note: C. of E. means Church of England. In our sample: 72% of pupils are in Community schools (1613 schools); 3% of pupils are 
in Voluntary Controlled schools (86 schools); 4% of pupils are in Foundation schools (72 schools) and 21% of pupils are in 
Voluntary Aided schools (641 schools). Total number of pupils: 201034. Total number of schools: 2412. 
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Table A2: Controls; summary statistics 
  Variable Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Min, Max 
 
Pupil level variables 
English as first language 201034 0.795 0.403 0, 1 
Female 201034 0.497 0.500 0, 1 
Pupil with Special Educational Needs (SEN) 201034 0.245 0.430 0, 1 
Free School Meal Eligible (FSME) pupil  201034 0.198 0.399 0, 1 
 
School level variables 
Pupil/qualified teacher ratio 201034 23.641 3.936 11.2, 108.3 
Total school size 201034 367.055 138.207 52, 1373 
Fraction of pupils with SEN 201034 0.209 0.090 0, 0.652 
Fraction of pupils eligible for FSM 201034 0.198 0.158 0, 0.771 
 
Postcode sector level variables 
Fraction of lone parents 199693 0.260 0.116 0.035, 0.606 
Fraction of unemployed  199693 0.037 0.018 0.007, 0.097 
Fraction with no school qualifications 199693 0.259 0.076 0.037, 0.535 
Fraction with Black ethnicity 199693 0.077 0.094 0, 0.536 
Fraction with Asian ethnicities 199693 0.116 0.134 0.001, 0.795 
Fraction of individuals aged 16 or below  199693 0.222 0.032 0.018, 0.431 
 
LEA Level Controls 
Total LEA expenditure in 2000 (in £1000) 201034 2170.823 1691.547 493, 5983 
LEA area (in 1,000,000 square metres) 201034 680.349 1076.473 12, 3451 
LEA deprivation score in 2000 198770 24.140 13.569 7.5, 61.34 
Note: Pupil level information obtained form Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC), academic years 2001/2002 and 
2002/2003. School level information obtained from Annual School Census (ASC), academic years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003; this 
refers to all pupils within a Primary school at various grades (from age 5 to age 11). Postcode sector level obtained from the Great 
Britain Census 2001. LEA level control information provided by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). 
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Table A3: Primary school choice, competition and pupil achievement;  
Key Stage 2, 2001/2-2002/3: percentiles of English and Mathematics test scores 
 KS2 English percentiles KS2 Maths percentiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Competition and choice together 
         
Number of schools 
accessible to pupil’s 
home 
0.081 
 (0.069) 
0.115 
(0.057)* 
0.080 
(0.435) 
-0.086  
(0.380) 
-0.038  
(0.071) 
0.024 
 (0.060) 
0.156  
(0.414) 
0.136 
(0.402) 
Average number of 
schools accessible to 
pupils in the school 
0.568 
(0.166)** 
0.360 
 (0.154)* 
-0.505  
(0.857) 
-0.753  
(0.787) 
0.691  
(0.171)** 
0.538  
(0.168)** 
-0.570  
(0.811) 
-1.067  
(0.851) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
KS1 controls No Writing  
Reading 
No Writing  
Reading 
No Maths No Maths 
Number of schools 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 2412 
Observations 196706 196706 196706 197829 197829 197829 201034 201034 
Note: Regressions at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school in round parenthesis: *, significant at 5%; **, significant at 1%. Controls include pupil median travel distance and number of pupils in 
travel area (Table 1), dummies for school type (Community, Foundation, and Voluntary Aided; Voluntary Controlled as excluded category) and variables listed in Appendix Table A2. Missing Postcode Sector 
Level and LEA Level variables recoded to zeros; dummies for missing Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level observations included in the specifications. Instruments in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) are log of 
distance between school and LEA boundary and between pupil home and LEA boundary, controlling for LEA average of log distance between school and LEA boundary and LEA average of log distance 
between pupil home and LEA boundary. 
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Table A4: Primary school choice, competition and pupil achievement; Key Stage 2, 2001/2-
2002/3: instrumental variable regression, robustness checks 
 Total value-added points 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Without no-LEA  
Crossing 
restriction  
Without no-LEA  
crossing restriction 
Control for home 
to school distance 
Control for home 
to school distance 
     
Number of schools  
accessible to pupil 
-0.090  
(0.457) 
-0.182 
(0.518) 
-0.040 
(0.168) 
-0.064 
(0.177) 
Average number of schools  
accessible to pupils in 
school 
-0.858 
(0.887) 
-1.016 
(0.950) 
-0.361 
(0.350) 
-0.464 
(0.373) 
     
First Stage Statistics     
F-Statistics [p-values]     
Choice equation 41.75 
[0.0000] 
44.19 
[0.0000] 
     355.17 
[0.0000] 
      408.74 
[0.0000] 
Competition equation 8.83 
[0.0002] 
10.11 
[0.0000] 
54.90 
[0.0000] 
57.43 
[0.0000] 
Partial-R2     
Choice equation 0.0061 0.0064 0.0433 0.0449   
Competition equation 0.0067 0.0077 0.0420 0.0440 
     
Controls No Yes No Yes 
Number of schools 2412 2412 2412 2412 
Observations 201034 201034 201034 201034 
Note: Regressions at the pupil level. Standard errors clustered on school in round parenthesis: *, significant at 5%; **, significant at 
1%. First stage statistics for models with standard errors clustered at the school level. Controls include pupil median travel distance 
and number of pupils in travel area (Table 1), dummies for school type (Community, Foundation, and Voluntary Aided; Voluntary 
Controlled as excluded category) and variables listed in Appendix Table A2. Missing Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level 
variables recoded to zeros; dummies for missing Postcode Sector Level and LEA Level observations included in the specifications. 
Instruments are log of distance between school and LEA boundary and pupil home and LEA boundary, controlling for LEA average 
of log distance between school and LEA boundary and LEA average of log distance between pupil home and LEA boundary. 
Choice index, without no-LEA crossing restriction, descriptive statistics (Columns (1) and (2)): mean=1.566; std.dev.=1.299. 
Competition index, without no-LEA crossing restriction, descriptive statistics (Columns (1) and (2)): mean=1.475; std.dev.= 1.084.  
Home to school distance, descriptive statistics ((Columns (3) and (4)): mean=1210.80; std.dev=1688.43. 
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